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THE TAX TREATMENT OF THE RESERVE FOR BAD DEBTS ON
INCORPORATION: THE SUPREME COURT RESOLUTION IN NASH
LEO J. RASKIND*
The recent Supreme Court opinion in Nash v. United States illus-
trates the close tolerances to which federal income tax issues are
honed.1 For more than half a dozen years a spate of cases was litigated by
taxpayers contesting the position of the Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue that income was generated by the reserve for bad debts on the trans-
fer of proprietorship or partnership accounts receivable and other property
to a controlled corporation.2 Ultimately a conflict was generated among
the circuit courts on this issue which the Supreme Court has now re-
solved by rejecting the Commissioner's analysis.3
Viewed in historical perspective, this controversy serves as a reminder
of the high costs of defective analysis to both the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice and taxpayers. Prior to the announcement in 1962 by the Commis-
sioner that transfers of such reserve accounts would be treated as income-
generating events, it was generally supposed that the reserve account was
cloaked by the deeply ingrained general principle of non-recognition of
gain on incorporation.4  In rejecting that position in a cursory manner,
the Commissioner contributed the first misstep.
Revenue Ruling 62-128 was brief and not to the point.5 Grounded on
inaccurate characterization of the role of the reserve account and on in-
apposite application of the tax benefit rule, this Ruling invited litigation
as a means of clarifying its application. From the easier vantage of
hindsight, it seems clear that a departure from the basic doctrines of non-
recognition of gain, if necessary at all, ought to have been made with the
detail of analysis and specificity of instance required to identify the narrow
circumstances of its application.
Professor of Law; Adjunct Professor of Economics, The Ohio State University.
1 Nash v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1550, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1177 (1970).
2 Scofield v. United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-1447 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Rowe v.
United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-443 (W.D. Ky. 1968), appeal authorized, P-H 1969
Fed. Taxes Citator 12,107; Robert P. Hutton, P-H Tax Ct. Rep. & Mem. Dec. par. 53.6 (Oct.
13, 1969); Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98 (1968), appeal filed, P-H 1969 Fed. Taxes
Citator 10,192; Birmingham Trust Nat'l Bank v. United States, 22 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5202
(N.D. Ala. 1969); Estate of Heinz Schmidt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1130 (1964), rev'd., 355
F.2d 111 (9th Cir. 1966). See on this problem, Notes, 1969 DuKE L.J. 1298; 53 MINN. L.
REV. 1354 (1969); 66 COLtJf. L 1Ev. 1186 (1966).
3 Nash v. United States, 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-5271 (5th Cir. 1969).
4 See, Darrell, Corporate Organizations and Reorganizations Under the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 32 TAXES 1007 (1954); Costolloe, Ineorporation of the Unincorporated Enter-
prise, 13 N.Y.U. INST. oN FED. TAX 685 (1955); Paul and Kalish, Transition From a Part-
nership To A Corporation, 18th N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx 639 (1960); Blanc, The Tax
Treatment of Reserves Upon A Change In The Form of Doing Business, U. So. CAL. 1967
TAX INT. 433.
Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 139.
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To have singled out the reserve for bad debts for special treatment
without explanation seems curious, anyway. The reserve method of valu-
ing bad debts is not a fruitful vehicle for tax avoidance. Moreover, in
accepting this method of valuing accounts receivable, the commissioner
provided adequate restrictions to circumscribe abuse.0
On balance, the controversy which ultimately was moved to the Su-
preme Court for resolution was generated by the failure of the basic Ruling
to recognize the dual function of the reserve account. In seeking to pro-
vide a flat statement in the original Ruling-an entirely appropriate goal,
the Service failed to identify in adequate functional and analytical terms
the instances in which recognition of gain was required. In assessing
the utility of the Supreme Court's resolution of this problem, it is appro-
priate to review the problem in the context of its origin.7
One ingredient of the erroneous position of the basic Ruling is its re-
strictive conception of the function of the reserve for bad debts account.
In accounting practice, the reserve method arises as a means of valuing
accounts receivable. Since an unknown probability of uncollectibility
clouds the accuracy of any stated dollar value of an account receivable
generated by credit sales, various methods have been devised to narrow
the overstatement in the dollar value of the receivable account. This
element of correction or adjustment is provided by the reserve account
whereby the account receivable is stated in gross terms and the estimated
uncollectible segment thereof is shown by the reserve. Thus the reserve
allowance is an aggregate estimate of the total amount of anticipated
bad debts without reference to any single ledger account of any individ-
ual customer. The reserve account serves in this way to adjust the
value and tax basis of receivables in a balance sheet sense.
In tax consequences, the reserve method of accounting for bad debts
also generates a deduction from gross income." By use of the reserve, a
taxpayer is permitted to deduct his anticipated bad debts in the year
of their anticipation, even though the actual loss has not yet been sus-
tained in any individual customer's account receivable. In recognizing
this practice, the Commissioner's Regulations contain the expected caveat
that a taxpayer using the reserve method will be required to justify the
reasonableness of any additions to the reserve in light of the facts exist-
ing at the close of the taxable year.9
In this function, the reserve serves to adjust the gross income of the
0 Treas. Reg. 1.166-1(d) (1969); Treas. Reg. 1.166-4 (1964); Broader doctrines such as
anticipatory assignment of income as well as provisions like § 482, would also be available to
bar abuses of the reserve method of account for bad debts.
7 For critical comment on the Ruling when it was issued, see Arent, Reallocatiop of In-
come and Expenses In Connection With Formation and Liquidation of Corporations, 40
TAXEs 995 (1962); Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalizatiop, 40 TAXES 974, 977 (1962).
8 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 16 6 (c); Treas. Reg. § 1.166-(4) (1964).
9 Treas. Reg. § 1.166-(4)(b) (1964).
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business. The deduction from gross income permitted by the use of
the reserve method adjusts gross income downward; the gross value of
the recorded receivables which will not contribute to ultimate cash re-
ceipts are thus withdrawn from gross income. In this fashion, the reserve
account serves an income statement function.
Recognition of this dual function of the reserve is a fixture of the ac-
counting literature; a leading authority notes of the reserve for bad
debts that it ". . . must be considered from the standpoint of both the
income statement and the balance sheet."' However, in his basic Ruling
which generated this series of cases seeking the appropriate characteriza-
tion of the reserve in the context of incorporating a partnership or sole
proprietorship, the Commissioner took a narrower view of the function of
the reserve."1
Couched in condusory terms, Revenue Ruling 62-128 announced as
its holding that the reserve for bad debts in this context,
... is not transferable to any other entity. Accordingly, the reserve for bad
debts represents ordinary income to the taxpayer for the taxable year during
which the transfer of the accounts receivable was made since, during such
time, his need for the reserve ceased. 12
A basic tax issue is raised by this brief reference to the non-transferability
of the reserve for bad debts. Unlike depredation reserves, Congress has
provided no detailed statutory machinery governing the transfer of bad-
debt reserves."3 The transfer of the latter on the occasion of formal
changes of business units has traditionally been controlled by case law,
Rulings, and Regulations. In this network of authority, the occasions
of income recognition were restricted to events of complete corporate
liquidation, either under general provisions or under § 337.1 A carry-
over of the reserve balance along with the accounts receivable where the
10 AccoUNTANTs HANDBOOK § 11.25 (4th ed. R. Wixon 1964).
11 Rev. Rul. 62-128, 1962-2, Cum. Bull. 139.
12 Id.
Is Unlike the reserve for depreciation, the bad debt reserve is not mentioned in Int. Rev.
Code § 381, which governs the carryover of the net operating loss and certain other accounts
and attributes in a corporate acquisition; the depreciation reserve is also subject to express statu-
tory adjustment requiring gain from depreciable property to be restored to ordinary income on
disposition of the asset, Int. Rev. Code §§ 1245 and 1250. The 1954 revision of the Code con-
tained a provision, § 462, which permitted accrual method taxpayers the election of using the
reserve method for certain estimated trade of business expenses; this provision was repealed
retroactively in 1955 by P. L 74; 69 Stat. 134 (1955); 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 852, 858. See also,
Blanc, The Tax Treatment of Reserves Upon a Change in the Form of Doing Business, U. So.
CAL. 1967 TAx INsT. 443.
14 In complete liquidations, the dissolving corporation will ordinarily be required to
restore to its final period income, the unused portion of its bad debt reserve; see, C. Standlee
Martin, Inc. v. Riddell, 51 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1376 (S.D. Cal. 1956); M & E Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 7 T.C. 1276 (1946). The same result would apply also to special statutory liquida-
tions, see INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H6 333(e), (f), 334(c); INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 337
has also been so interpreted, see, West Seattle National Bank v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 47
(9th Cir. 1961), affg 33 T.C. 341 (1959).
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transfer was occasioned only by a change of form was not, prior to the
Ruling, considered to require the restoration of the reserve balance to in-
come.15 Given the clear break with the established and accepted doc-
trines on this point, the brief announcement in the Ruling that the §
351 context henceforth required restoration of the reserve balance was
troublesome.
No less difficult to accept without explanation was the correlative
conclusion in the Ruling that the "need" for the reserve had ceased in
the context of incorporation. On this point, the Ruling again widened
the gap between the settled interpretation of reserve accounting and its
announced position. In general terms, the reference to the cessation of
the "need" for the reserve is misleading in the context of a transfer, be-
cause as a valuation account, the reserve is not usefully considered as a
separate item independent of the receivables account for which it was
created.' 8 Functionally the two accounts operate together, with the re-
serve serving to reduce the stated amount of the receivables by the esti-
mated amount of uncollectible items. In traditional accounting theory,
the reserve is to be restored to income if the stated receivables were
collected at full stated value, not because the "need" for the reserve had
ceased, but because the estimated amount of non-collectibles had not ma-
terialized in income terms. It is not entirely inappropriate to refer to the
"cessation of need" in these circumstances, but such a broad reference
does not serve when narrow analysis is required.
What the Ruling might have provided was a statement of those in-
stances in which the transfer of the reserve was to be examined on the
occasion of incorporation to determine whether an over-estimate of loss
on collection of receivables had been made. In those instances, the prior
over-estimate would appropriately have been cured by a restoration to
income of the amount of over-estimate. To depart from the narrow issue
of rectifying an over-deduction by the broad language of "cessation of
need" was inarticulate.
Apparently the concept of "cessation of need" was injected into this
controversy by the Commissioner's misplaced reliance in the Ruling on
the Geyer, Cornell & Newell case which he cites for this proposition.'"
That case does not identify the income issues raised by the transfer of
the reserve in a § 351 context for several reasons. First, it essentially in-
volved a complete liquidation. Second, it is an instance in which the re-
ceivables were collected in full. There the corporate taxpayer using the
1 5 See note 4, supra.
16 "A reserve consists of entries upon books of account. It is neither an asset nor a
liability. It has no existence except upon the books, and, unlike an asset or a liability, it can-
not be transferred to any other entity." Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc., v. Commissioner, 6
T.C. 96, 100 (1946).
17 Geyer, Cornell & Newell, Inc., v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 96 (1946).
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reserve method sold for cash all its assets, with the exception of some
liquid assets and its receivables, in one year. The corporation ceased its
business operations but continued to hold and collect the retained receiv-
ables, virtually all of which were collected by the end of the year of sale.
Five years later (the receivables having been fully collected in interim)
the corporate taxpayer transferred the remaining assets to the same pur-
chaser, and was dissolved. The litigated issue was whether the bad debt
reserve was to be restored to income in the prior year when the receivables
were collected or in the subsequent year of final transfer and liquidation.
In holding that the restoration was to take place in the prior year of
substantial collection, the Tax Court accepted the Commissioner's posi-
tion that the "need for the reserve ceased" in the earlier year.' 8
In a descriptive sense, the need for the reserve had ceased in the
Geyer case when the receivables were collected in full. However, the
narrower and more accurate ground for requiring the restoration to in-
come of the amount of the reserve is the tax benefit principle. The
case is more appropriately cited for that operative proposition. Thus the
collection in the prior year of the receivables constituted a recovery of
debts previously deducted as worthless. Had the Ruling in 1962 been
rested exclusively on the tax benefit rule instead of on the cessation of
need concept with a qualification of the tax benefit rule, the subsequent
controversy might have been avoided. 9 Perhaps the most unfortunate
part of the Ruling's reliance on the Geyer and Martin cases, is the im-
plication that the § 351 transaction is for this purpose to be treated like a
complete liquidation.20
The subsequent widening of the controversy can be traced to the Rul-
ing. The weight afforded the Commissioner's Ruling by the Tax Court
was apparent in Schmidt, the first case to be litigated under it.2 '
There the sole issue was the proper accounting treatment of the reserve
for bad debts on the occasion of the transfer of all proprietorship assets,
including receivables, to a controlled corporation under § 351.22 The
problem was presented to the Tax Court in terms of doric simplicity, the
Commissioner having conceded that the amount of the reserve was rea-
sonable and that the transfer otherwise qualified under § 351. In holding
that the taxpayer was required to restore the balance of the reserve to
18 See note 16, supra.
10A strict interpretation of the tax benefit principle would have barred the issuance
of the Ruling in the first instance; for such a recent interpretation of the tax benefit rule in
his context see Nash v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1550; 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 1177 (1970)
and text, infra, at notes 36, 37.
2 0 See notes, 14 and 17, supra.
2 1 Estate of Heinz Schmidt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1130 (1964) revd., 17 Am. Fed. Tax.
R.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1966).
2 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 351.
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income, the Tax Court stated its agreement with the position of the
Government in Revenue Ruling 62-128 by noting that
[W]hen the proprietorship terminated, the need for maintaining the re-
serve for bad debts ceased and therefore the balance in the account at the
time of termination should be restored to income.23
Following the Ruling further in treating the transfer, on incorpora-
tion like the transactions of complete liquidation, the Tax Court drew
an analogy between the litigated transaction and a § 337 liquidation. 4
Having removed any independent significance from the § 351 nature of
the transaction, the court concluded by pointing out the absence of any
statutory authority for carrying over the reserve for bad debts .2  In
Schmidt the broad theory of the Ruling had come into its own.
The ninth circuit, however, was not persuaded; in reversing the Tax
Court, it undertook to return the resolution of the controversy to basic
principles. 2" The ninth circuit opinion laid the groundwork for the ulti-
mate conflict between the circuits by rejecting the Commissioner's reliance
on the concept of cessation of the need for the reserve. The appeals
court first pointed out the reliance on this concept in the Ruling, but
noted that the case law, notwithstanding some language in the opinions,
did not support the Commissioner's conclusion.2 7  More narrowly, the
ninth circuit opinion required that the issue of restoring the reserve to in-
come be decided on the precise ground of recovery. Thus the opinion
states,
It is quite true that the taxpayer no longer 'needed' the reserve, but it is
certainly not true, in any economic sense, that he has recovered its value....
23Estate of Heinz Schmidt v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1130, 1134 (1964) rev'd., 17 Am.
Fed. Tax R.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1966).
24 The Tax Court opinion states:
The Government's position follows Rev. Rul. 62-128 ... and is in accord with our
position in West Seattle National Bank... The Court... ruled... [there] that the
nonrecognition provisions of Section 337 did not apply .... A like result is called for
in the present case.
Estate of Heinz Schmidt, at 1135.
25 The Court notes,
It is true, as petitions point out, that in Citizens Federal S. & L Ass'n of Cleve-
land v. United States, 290 F.2d 932 (Ct. C.) . . . there is a dictum which distin-
guishes a sale . . . from a nonrecognizable transaction where the same interests
continue to operate the same business in a different form and where the need for
the reserve continues. The difficulty with the dictum, however, is that it does not
appear to be based upop any statutory provision, nor have the parties called our at-
tention to any statutory language providing for the carryover of the bad debt reserve
to the transferee. (Italics added)
Id. at 1135-6.
26 Estate of Heinz Schmidt v. Commissioner, 355 F.2d 111, 17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 242
(1966).
27The opinion states,
In Revenue Ruling 62-128 .... the Commissioner relies upon certain language in the
cases that he cites to the effect that the taxpayers did not any longer "need" the
reserve.... The cases, however, do not go so far.
17 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 242, 244.
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And there is no gain merely because the reserve is no longer 'needed';
rather the correctness of the reserve as an estimate of those is ...[dis-
positive].28
The ninth circuit also pointed out the necessity of identifying the func-
tion of the reserve account in each case. In the record before it, there
was a finding that the taxpayer had received stock certificates reflecting
the net rather than the gross value of the receivables.
The controversy widened and deepened. Although two district courts
followed the reasoning of the ninth circuit in doctrinally indentical cases,
the Tax Court in Schuster, with three judges dissenting, adhered to the
theory of the Ruling as interpreted below in Schmidt.2 9  By its opinion
in Nash, the fifth circuit ripened the controversy for Supreme Court reso-
lution.30 The fifth circuit's opinion invites invidious comparison with the
more structured discussion of the ninth circuit in Schmidt.31 Overall,
the opinion is essentially a recitation of the competing contentions of the
Commissioner and the taxpayer, devoid of any sorting out of the key ele-
ments in the transaction at issue. Thus obeisance is made to the reigning
principle of cessation of the need for the reserve, but its operative signifi-
cance is withdrawn by the qualification that income is to be restored
under this principle, "generally ...only upon final liquidation or upon
sale of the assets in a manner that demonstrates that they are worth face
value." 32
This qualification would seem to withdraw the utility of the principle of
cessation of need in much of the § 351 area. The opinion announces its
adherence to the Commissioner's position by stating in succession that the
"Government's position is at least technically correct," and that the court
would, "without attempting to be too precise" give its views of the scope
of non-recognition under § 351." 3
The basic contentions below were presented to the Supreme Court.
28 Id.
29 Scofield v. United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 69-1447 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Rowe v.
United States, 23 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-443 (W.D. Ky. 1968), appeal authorized P-H 1969
Fed. Taxes Citator 12,107; Schuster v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 98 (1968).
3 0 Nash v. United States, 414 F.2d 627; 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-5271 (1969).
31 See note 29, supra.
32 24 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 69-5271, 69-5273 (1969).
33The opinion suggests that it would be inappropriate and inconsistent with the policy
of § 351 to allow nonrecognition on the transfer of the reserve. The reasoning is not per-
suasive. The Court apparently assumed that a loss will result at the time of the transfer of
the accounts receivable to the corporation by assuming further that the partnership basis in
the accounts receivable was their face value and that they were transferred to the corporation
at their net value. From this perspective, the bad debt reserve is apparently entirely inde-
pendent of the receivables account;, the better view would be that the amount of the reserve
would have been restored to income when the determination was made that the partnership
basis in the receivables was their face value. That determination would negate the existence
of the reserve since it would state that the probability of non-collection was zero. Id. For a
discussion of the determination of the basis of accounts receivable see Raich v. Commissioner,
46 T.C. 604 (1966).
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The losing taxpayers in the fifth circuit attacked the validity of the Ruling
and the inappropriateness of the selection of § 351 transactions as occa-
sions for the extended application of the tax benefit rule to reserve ac-
count.8 4 The Government, urged the Court to accept the validity of the
Ruling and the need to treat the reserve account in § 351 transactions on
a parity with § 337 treatment.85
The brief opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas effectively resolves this con-
troversy on narrow functional lines. Given the history of this dispute, it
was to have been anticipated that some lack of unanimity would appear
even in the Supreme Court. In brief statements of dissent Mr. Justice
Black and Mr. Justice Stewart indicate their preference for the result in the
fifth circuit and in the majority opinion of the Tax Court in Schuster."'
Speaking for the majority, Mr. Justice Douglas rejected the cessation
of need concept of the Ruling as an appropriate occasion to invoke the
tax benefit rule in connection with the reserve for bad debts. Like the
ninth circuit, the majority opinion requires that a benefit or recovery be
shown in order to require restoration of the reserve account to income.
The Court pointed out the misplaced identity of recovery with cessation of
need, as follows:
Congress could make the end of 'need' synonymous with 'recovery' in the
meaning of the tax benefit rule and make the rule read: 'a bad debt
reserve which has produced an income tax benefit in a prior year is to
be added to income in the year in which it is recovered or when its need
is.ended.' The semantics would then be honored by the Commissioner's
ruling. But we do not feel free to state the tax benefit rule in those
terms in this context. (Italics added)37
The majority explicated the traditional view that application of the
tax benefit rule required a recovery without any connotation of cessation
of need by noting that the value of the stock received by the taxpayers was
equal to the net value of the receivables. The Court thus recognized the
function of the reserve account in the context of the § 351 transfer by
stating,
A tax benefit was received by the partnership when the bad debt re-
serve was originally taken as a deduction from income. There would be
a double benefit to the partnership if securities were issued covering the
face amount of receivables. We do not, however, understand how there
can be a 'recovery' of the benefit of the bad debt reserve when the re-
ceivables are transferred less the reserve. 8
The opinion is ended on a note of acceptance of the reasoning of the
8 4 Brief for Petitioners at 16-17, Nash v. United States, see note 36, in ra.
8 5 Brief for United States at 9-11, Nash v. United States, see note 36, infra.
386Nash v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1550, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1177 (1970).




Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Schmidt case; in the final para-
graph, the Court restates with approval, the conclusion of the ninth cir-
cuit that the cessation of need for the reserve does not constitute a re-
covery within the meaning of the tax benefit principle.
The narrowest effect of this brief opinion by the Supreme Court is to
strike down Revenue Ruling 62-128. By rejecting the concept of cessa-
tion of need as having any significance for invoking the tax benefit rule,
the Court has withdrawn the single conceptual basis of the Ruling and
ended its significance.
The content of the opinion warrants the conclusion that the Court has
done more than return the problem of the tax treatment of the bad debt
reserve in this context to the general principles that governed prior to
the announcement of Revenue Ruling 62-128. To be sure, the brief opin-
ion, appropriately limited to the narrowest ground of decision, contains
no such pronouncements. Yet the existence of a Supreme Court opinion
in this area, necessarily generates some shading of the pre-existing doc-
trines.
The principal change effected by this opinion is to underscore the
role of the reserve in the valuation of the receivables transferred to the
corporation. By adopting the reasoning of the ninth circuit in Schmidt,
the Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the determination
made there of the transfer of the receivables at their net value. As a
result of this opinion, the pre-incorporation planning of taxpayers will
now require renewed concern with the mode of valuing receivables; the
Service can be expected to assess deficiencies in those instances in which
the reserve has not been absorbed in the valuation process. Such litiga-
tion as ultimately arises on this score would seem now to require a finding
by a lower court on the function of the reserve in the valuation of the
transferred receivables. An added reference in the opinion to the reserve
for bad debts as a valuation account reinforces this conclusion.39
Otherwise, the Supreme Court opinion leaves the matter essentially
where it was prior to the escalation of what might have been an incon-
sequential pother. Some, none, or all of the reserve for bad debts will be
restored to income on a complete liquidation or termination of a business
taxpayer depending on the accuracy of the reserve balance as a predic-
tion of uncollectibles and as a measure of the final transfer value of the
receivables. In this context, complete liquidation will include typical
corporate liquidations as well as those of a subsidiary by a parent, and
those pursuant to the terms of I.R.C. §§ 333 and 337. The transfers of
reserves for bad debts upon incorporation will generally be the occasion
for a carryover of the reserve balance to the corporation, without more,
3 Nash v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 1550, 1551 at n.4, quoting Geyer, Cornell & Newell;
see note 16 supra. The same point is repeated by a quotation from the leading citic of Rev.
Rul. 62-128; see note 7, supra.
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where the occasion of the transfer conforms to the I.R.C. § 351 require-
ments and is merely change in the form of a business unit.
This instance of an eight year lag in the reversal of an inappropriate
characterization serves as a sobering reminder of the real and money costs
of error in this context.
